Tag Archive for 2014

NHD 2014 Washington State 1st Place Documentary – Miranda v. Arizona: Liberty and Justice for All

This documentary received first place at the 2014 National History Day competition in Washington State for the Senior Group Documentary category. Ray Fung, Jeffrey Maxwell, Eric Zhu, and Jake Millman made this documentary with a focus on the Miranda Rights and how they affect this year’s theme, “Rights and Responsibilities in History.”

Link to the process paper and bibliography:
http://goo.gl/cTGAVH

Video Rating: / 5

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 36

Check out these Resume images:

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 36
Resume
Image by COD Newsroom
College of DuPage hosted its second annual Career Fair, sponsored by the Chicago Tribune Feb. 8, on the College’s main campus in Glen Ellyn.

The event provided information and networking opportunities for job seekers who are unemployed or underemployed, looking to change careers, or recent graduates who are not yet employed in their chosen field.

Columbia Tower Lobby (Looking Out)
Resume
Image by Me in ME
The Portland Camera Club resumes next month and an assignment was to bring a print to the first meeting and the category is "doors and windows". I am not sure if that means doors or windows or both in one photo. I put up two more on this topic. Both taken in Seattle of the Columbia Tower. One from the lobby interior looking out and the other from the outside looking in.

The floor had a high polish and provided a great reflective surface.

Columbia Center (formerly Bank of America Tower and Columbia Seafirst Center) is the tallest skyscraper in the downtown Seattle skyline and the tallest building in the State of Washington. At 287 m (943 ft) it is currently the second tallest structure on the West Coast (after Los Angeles’s 72 story U.S. Bank Tower). The tower has the tallest public viewing area on the West Coast and west of the Mississippi. It occupies most of the block bounded by Fourth and Fifth Avenues and Cherry and Columbia Streets. It contains 76 stories of class-A office space above ground and seven stories of various use below ground, (Wikipedia)

Fixers Tenants’ Rights story on ITV News London, August 2014

Fixers Tenants' Rights story on ITV News London, August 2014

Find out more about Upile’s Fixers campaign: http://www.fixers.org.uk/news/10232-11208/tenants-rights-fix-on-itv.php

Landlords that refuse to rent to tenants on benefits, because they think they will skip payments or wreck their properties are being challenged by 23-year-old Upile Chasowa.

Upile, who’s from Wood Green in North London, wants to tackle the prejudice that he feels can prevent people on low incomes from renting in the private sector.

His story was shown on ITV News London in August 2014.
Video Rating: / 5

2014 GMC Terrain lease only $139 per month at Axelrod Buick GMC in Parma, OH

2014 GMC Terrain lease only 9 per month at Axelrod Buick GMC in Parma, OH

June 2014 commercial featuring a lease offer on the 2014 GMC Terrain only 9 per month for 24 months. See store for details. Axelrod Buick GMC on the corner of Pearl Road and Brookpark Rd. in Parma is Cleveland’s GM’s Mark of Excellence choice for new Buick and GMC models, GM Certified Pre-Owned, and quality used vehicles. Axelrod has been “treating customers like family since 1979” and remains grateful and humbled by those who have supported us with their patronage. We also have GM Certified Service technicians standing by to help Northeast Ohio with all the vehicle service needs. Thank you for taking a moment to watch! You can learn more about Axelrod Buick GMC at http://.www.axelrodbuickgmc.com. We are a short drive from Strongsville, North Olmstead, Westlake, Akron, Canton, Mentor, and you! (95 due at signing, 10k miles per year, OAC, other restrictions apply.)
Video Rating: / 5

Ukraine 1905 – 2014: POTEMKIN BARRICADES & MYTHICAL STEPS

A few nice Resume writing images I found:

Ukraine 1905 – 2014: POTEMKIN BARRICADES & MYTHICAL STEPS
Resume writing
Image by Imaginary Museum Projects: News Tableaus
This refers to the mythical Odessa steps of the the fiction docu-drama Potemkin by Sergej Eisenstein. The movie – however impressive in its visuals – creates a fantasy history around a series of historical events in the year 1905 in the west Ukraine port at the Black Sea. First of all there were social and labour unrests and strikes in the town. Second there was the mutiny on the large naval ship named after Prince Potemkin (the protegé of Czarina Catherine II, who helped invading and colonising of the Ukraine and Krim up to then part of the Ottoman sphere of influence). Potemkin is also famous for what many see as ‘a historical myth’, the building of sham cardboard villages along the Dnieper river during a state visit of Czarina Catherine II to the newly conquered territories of her empire. These ‘Potemkin Villages’ were to hide the real fact of destruction and disaster in the area wrought by the colonising campaign. It became (in Anglo-saxon countries especially) a figure in political speech.

The 1905 revolution that swept over the whole of Russia did get with the ‘Mutiny of the Potemkin Sailors’ and especially its dramatisation in an artistic propaganda movie twenty years later, one of its most emblematic heroic events. The famous scene of the imperial (Cossack) troops firing at unarmed citizens and the child carriage that bumps down the two hundred steps between the high town and the low harbour front, is inscribed in the memory of many, even today. That this shooting is not based on historical fact, who cares? Good & Bad are clearly defined in that "master work" and one wishes that real history would have been exactly like that. Sadly so, it was not. (1)

The town of Odessa was already on strike before the Potemkin ship arrived. and the the rebellious sailors did indeed threaten at one moment to use the immense cannons of what had become "their ship" in support of the revolting people of Odessa. This did not happen in real. Even more so, the rebellious ship did draw so much attention that the local; movement was overwhelmed by it. (2) There were many reasons why big canons with the imprecise kind of artillery of that time could hardly be used in support of a popular rising in a town, without killing or harming those in need of support. At one stage local hoodlums (bosiaki) started to loot and this has been one of the elements that led to the decision (in St. Petersburg) to repress the popular rising with brute force. (3) What remains mostly out of sight is how this movement was preceded and followed (later in the year) by major pogroms against the large Jewish population of Odessa. This did not fit the later heroic Bolchevist depiction of the "revolution" in Odessa. (4)

All this comes to mind when one tries to make sense of the complicated events in the Ukraine these days. Instead of the influence spheres of the end of the 18th century (Persian, Ottoman, Russian, Habsburg) we see the Russian Federation, the European Union, the USA and the complex of states in turmoil to the south in the Middle East.

Heroic depiction of street barricades and lots of waving flags and attempts to simplify the situation by opposing (ex-communist) totalitarian Russians, to freedom loving new-democratic Ukrainians, it all is a sham. Potemkin barricades that hide the complexity of power groups and their struggles. One of the elements is a growing 19th century style ‘nationalism’ that strives for the resurrection of a primordial Ukrainian nation, a nation that is as fictional as the movie Potemkin of Eisenstein almost one century ago. (5)

====

NB These are extensive footnotes for a short text, they serve a purpose: drawing a dividing line between the practice of ‘history proper’ and ‘mythical views’ that we are offered and we may also cherish, that pretend to be historical. The footnotes are meant like backdrops to view ‘history unfolding’ today on the stage of our mass-media in the case of the Ukraine.
As the academic books I am quoting are often not readably available to a wide readership, I post here some longer quotations for those who are doubting at what I state, or those who want to go in more detail.

(1) Still working in making a selection of quotations from the many academic references to the Eisenstein Potemkin movie and its partly fictional character. "Cinema as an integral part of history" in the words of D.J. (Charles) Wenden (1923-1992), who has published a detailed scrutiny of fact and fabrication of Eisenstein’s Potemkin in this book: Rosenthal, Alan. 1999. Why docudrama?: fact-fiction on film and TV. Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois University Press. ; p. 64. www.worldcat.org/oclc/38249916 ]. This is the most detailed critical study I could find. Some more examples will be posted here tomorrow (4/3/2014 tj.)

(2) "The mutineers decided to anchor in Odessa harbor and await the am’val of the rest of the fleet. They intended for the mutinous Potemldn to support the Odessa populace by threatening to shell the city if the government attempted to quell street disturbances with force.” During the early morning hours of June 15, the huge battleship arrived in the harbor of Odessa; it altered the complexion of events in several significant ways. While the sailors’ mutiny did not trigger social unrest in Odessa, the presence of a naval vessel in open defiance of the government increased the likelihood (particularly in the minds of revolutionaries like Lenin, who sent an emissary to Odessa to direct what he thought was an impending insurrection) that the unrest gripping Odessa would intensity and lead to a successful uprising. As a gendarme’s report, dated June 22, stated, “the disorders would undoubtedly not have attained the grand scale that they did if the battleship had not arrived.” More importantly, the mutiny overshadowed events in the streets: the entire populace of Odessa turned its attention to the port and battleship, where the outcomes of the naval mutiny and popular disturbances were being determined. Until the departure of the Pomnlrin several days later, all eyes focused on the ship, as civilians and oflicials anxiously awaited the sailors’ next move."
[Weinberg, Robert. 1993. The revolution of 1905 in Odessa: blood on the steps. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ; p. 132. www.worldcat.org/oclc/26129832
Several pages are available on-line via GoogleBooks preview: encrypted.google.com/books?id=SIYt6hxoq18C&lpg=PP1&am…]

"Despite the proclaimed intentions of the sailors to support the current unrest in Odessa, the crew of the Potemkin did not render any assistance and rejected a joint appeal by the city’s revolutionary organizations to fumish weapons, shell the city, and send an armed landing force to direct an uprising. Several factors explain this failure to take decisive action and throw the full firepower of the battleship behind the workers of Odessa. Not only did a significant portion of the crew want to avoid additional bloodshed, but a majority of the sailors wanted to confer with crews on other ships of the Black Sea fleet ( which were speedily making their way to Odessa with orders to suppress the mutiny) before making any important decisions. The sailors also did not want to weaken the defense of the ship by sending an armed detachment to shore. The ship’s crew reasoned that sailors on land are like fish out of water and cannot be as effective a military force as they are on board. Consequently, the sailors refused to fulfill the request for armed assistance made by several SDs who managed to make their way onto the battleship. Instead, the crew suggested the revolutionaries return to shore and tell the crowds to remain calm and patient.
he Bolsheviks, in a sudden change of tactics, joined the Bundists in voicing their disappointment with the sailor‘s inaction, since they now believed that bombardment of the city center could spark a successful armed oiiensive on government buildings. The Mensheviks, also changing their thinking on the value of armed uprising, opposed bombardment because they feared too many innocent bystanders would die; they urged the crowds thronging the harbor to disperse peacefully and avoid confrontations with the police and military.“ As one Soviet historian has written, “Not one of the party organizations rose to the occasion” to lead the rebellious populace. Yet it is highly improbable that the revolutionary parties could have assumed direction of the unrest on either shore or ship given their disunity, indecision, poor organization, understaffing, and, most importantly, the independence of the workers and mutinous sailors. As in May, the SDs were condemned to the role of spectators. Twenty years after the events of June, one Bolshevik participant remembered that the strike was “completely divorced from party leadership."" [Ibid.; p. 134.]

(3) "Instead of taking the offensive as they had done on the previous two days, Odessa workers ceded center stage to the sailors and were relatively calm until late afternoon on June 15. Several violent and bloody incidents did occur, however, including intermittent shooting throughout the day at the police and military from roofiops and apartment houses, ambushes of police by angry mobs screaming “Beat the police!,’’ and the occasional throwing of bombs.
In the late afternoon and early evening, the crowd in the harbor area began to plunder warehouses. The composition of the looters is difficult to ascertain, since the crowd at the port included men and women of all ages and social groups. But many contemporary accounts attribute the trouble to persons of “undetermined occupations” (bez opredelennykh zaniatii) or bosiaki, the latter word a catchall term that literally means “barefoot ones” and refers to the urban homeless and downtrodden. In common parlance, bosiaki encompassed the lumpenproletariat of urban Russia and could include day laborers and dockworkers as well as vagrants and the homeless, the permanently and gainfully employed as well as the chronically unemployed among the casual labor force.
(…)
Fortified by vodka and wine that vandals took from the unguarded storerooms in the port and inspired by inflammatory speeches exhorting them to storm the warehouses, the crowd continued looting warehouses. They carrried off by hand, on horseback, and in rowboats and wagons whatever items they found. Despite the military cordon, many Odessans made their way out of the port into the city center, where they proudly displayed their booty and frequently fell into the hands of the police and military. One dockworker, repeating reports that he had heard at the docks, stated that people in Moldavanka believed that the “tsar has given poor people three days of freedom to take what they want from the port." According to accounts in Iskra and Revoliutsiannaia Rosriia (Revolutionary Russia), some sailors, workers, and members of the general public guarded storerooms of vodka from looting, confiscated liquor from rioters, and threw bottles and cases of alcohol into the Black Sea." [Ibid.; p. 135.]

(4) "Two militantly patriofic and pro-tsarist groups, the Holy League and Unity and Strength, had been stirring up anti-Semitic sentiments in Odessa since late 1903, drawing their inspiration from the wellknown right-wing politicians V. M. Purishkevich and P. A. Krushevan. The latter‘s newspaper, Znamia (Banner), was frequently distributed free throughout the city, especially in the harbor and workers’ districts, and was accused by Mayor Zelenyi of fomenting a pogromist atmosphere. Beginning in late January 1905, leaflets circulated blaming the non-Russian nationalities, such as the Georgians, Poles, Armenians, and especially the Jews, for anti-govemment opposition. The pamphlets called upon Russians to “beat the Jews, students and wicked people who seek to harm our Fatherland” and rid Russia of Jews who “are the cause of evil and grief.” The Russian Assembly, the largest right-wing grouping in Russia at the time, also contributed to the anti-Semitic atmosphere by opening a local chapter in early 1905. "
[Weinberg, Robert. 1993. The revolution of 1905 in Odessa: blood on the steps. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ; p. 138. www.worldcat.org/oclc/26129832 ]

"During the June unrest, right-wing agitators and pogrom-mongerers appeared in the street. They ac- cused Jews of instigating the current disorders and and encouraged gentiles to attack them. An SR account mentions bicyclists passing out leaflets blaming the Jews for the unrest of June 13, 14, and 15. Similar provocations also occurred during the riot and destruction of the harbor on June 15, resulting in the death of two anti-Semitic rabble rousers: one was shot by Bundists, the other thrown into the Black Sea by furious workers. In one instance a group of workers, at the urging of a Bundist speaker, beat to death a policeman from the Port Authority who had heckled the orator and tried to incite the crowd against her with anti-Semitic remarks." [Ibid.; p. 139.]

"Jews prompted activist Jews to mobilize. Unlike in past years, when they did not take precautions, Jews in Odessa braced themselves for attacks. Building on self-defense groups they had first formed (with the assistance of the Zubatovites) in the aftermath of the 1903 Kishinev pogrom and when fear of a pogrom spread through the city in 1904, Odessa’s Jews armed themselves and issued appeals, calling upon non-Jewish residents of Odessa to show restraint and not engage in violent acts against Jews. Just before Easter Sunday, which fell on April 17, the National Committee of Jewish Self-Defense distributed a series of leaflets threatening non-Jews with armed retaliation in the event of a pogrom. The committee urged all Jews to join self-defense brigades and prepare to counter any attack on Jewish lives and property. Many Jewish residents of Odessa followed the committee’s advice to arm themselves with guns, knives, clubs, and whips, and to prepare solutions of sulfuric acid. The Bund, Bolsheviks, and Menshevilts joined in these efforts by reorganizing self-defense brigades they had formed the year before and taking up collections for the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition. The Bund in particular feared that street demonstrations planned for Monday, April 18, to coincide with May Day celebrations in the rest of Europe, would lead to anti-Jewish violence. Despite these preparations, local officials as well as the correspondent of the Bund’s newspaper concluded that rumors of a pogrom were unfounded. In fact, the Bund’s correspondent wrote that “a pogromist mood was . . . unnoticeable”; Neidhardt’s office stated that it had not observed any “pogrom-mongering leaflets,” condemned the leaflets of the National Com- mittee of Jewish Self-Defense for “slander” and for giving rise to “alarm among the peaceful residents of our cultured city." April 17 and 18 came and went without serious incident or sign of trouble. The same could not be said for events in June. During the June unrest, right-wing agitators and pogrom-mongerers appeared in the street. They ac- cused Jews of instigating the current disorders and and encouraged gentiles to attack them. An SR account mentions bicyclists passing out leaflets blaming the Jews for the unrest of June 13, 14, and 15. Similar provocations also occurred during the riot and destruction of the harbor on June 15, resulting in the death of two anti-Semitic rabble rousers: one was shot by Bundists, the other thrown into the Black Sea by furious workers. In one instance a group of workers, at the urging of a Bundist speaker, beat to death a policeman from the Port Authority who had heckled the orator and tried to incite the crowd against her with anti-Semitic remarks. In the week or so following the massive disorders of mid-June, scattered attacks against Jews were reported as anti-Semitic agitators tried to spark a pogrom among gentiles. On June 20, an anonymous, virulently anti-Semitic, four-page broadside entitled Odesskie dni (Odessa Days) appeared. It blamed the Jews, in particular the National Committee of Jewish Self-Defense and Jewish secondary school students, for the recent disorders and the tragedy at the port. Accusing Jews of fomenting the unrest and enlisting the support of unwitting Russians, the author of the broadside stated that Jews initiated the shootings of June 14 and 15 and were responsible for setting fire to the port. The tract ended with a call to hold the Odessa Jewish community collectively responsible for the destruction and demanded compensation for gentiles who suffered property damage and personal loss. In addition, the broadside called for disarming all Jews in Odessa and suggested a general search of all Jewish apartments in the city. Failure to carry out these suggestions, the tract concluded, would make it “impossible for Christians to live in Odessa” and result in a take-over by Jews." Although Odesskie dni did not call for acts of mti-Jewish violence and did not lead to any attacks on Jews, its appearance graphically illustrates how in times of social unrest and political crisis, ethnic hostility could come to the fore and threaten further disruption of social calm. Jews found it diflicult to dispel the accusations expressed in Odeski: dni, which found their way into the reports of government officials who also held Odessa Jewry responsible for the June unrest." Gendarme chief Kuzubov wrote that the instigators of the unrest and arson were “exclusively Jews,” and Count Aleksei P. Ignat’ev, the fiercely reactionary chairman of a government conference set up in 1905 to address the issues of state security and religious minorities, seconded this conclusion in his report on the June disorders in Kherson and Ekaterinoslav provinces. Ignat’ev, who fell victim to an SR assassin in late 1906, accused Jews of setting fire to the port, although he, like most other government ofiicials, furnished no hard evidence or substantiation.“ These reports highlight the emotionally charged aunosphere of Russian-Jewish relations in Odessa and the extent to which government officials were hard-pressed to make nuanced assessments. In their search for simple explanations and their unwillingness to dig deeper into the root causes of the turmoil in Odessa, bureaucrats and police alike were prepared to affix blame to the Jews. The anti-Jewish campaign in June foreshadowed events in October, when a vicious pogrom would erupt during another period of social and political turmoil." [Ibid.; p. 139-140.]

(5) "In the port city of Odessa alone, the police reported that at least 400 Jews and 100 non-Jews were killed and approximately 300 people, mostly Jews, were injured, with slightly over 1,600 Jewish houses, apartments, and stores incurring damage. These official figures undoubtedly underestimate the true extent of the damage, as other informed sources indicate substantially higher numbers of persons killed and injured. For example, Dmitri Neidhardt, City Governor of Odessa during the pogrom and brother-in-law of the future Prime Minister Peter Stolypin, estimated the number of casualties at 2,500, and the Jewish newspaper Voskhod reported that over 800 were killed and another several thousand were wounded. Moreover, various hospitals and clinics reported treating at least 600 persons for injuries sustained during the pogrom. Indeed, no other city in the Russian Empire in 1905 experienced a pogrom comparable in its destruction and violence to the one unleashed against the Jews of Odessa."
[Robert Weinberg, "The Pogrom of 1905 in Odessa: A Case Study" in Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History, John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds. (Cambridge,1992): 248-89; available on-line via faculty.history.umd.edu/BCooperman/NewCity/Pogrom1905.html ; p. 1. ]

"Yet fear of an impending pogrom resurfaced in June in the aftermath of a general strike and disorders occasioned by the arrival of the battleship Potemkin. On 13 June Cossacks shot several workers from metalworking and machine-construction factories who had been on strike since the beginning of May. Workers retaliated on 14 June by engaging in massive work stoppages and attacking the police with guns and rocks, but the arrival of the Potemkin that night diverted the workers from further confrontation with their employers and the government. On 15 June instead of intensifying the strike, thousands of Odessans jammed the port district in order to view the battleship and rally behind the mutinous sailors. By late afternoon some members of the crowd began to ransack warehouses and set fire to the harbor’s wooden buildings. Although available sources do not allow a precise determination of the composition of the rioters, partial arrest records reveal that non-Jewish vagrants (liudi bex opredelennykh zaniatii), dockworkers, and other day laborers comprised the majority. To suppress the unrest, the military cordoned off the harbor and opened fire on the trapped crowd. By the next morning well over 1,000 people had died, victims of either the soldiers’ bullets or the fire which consumed the harbor." [Ibid.; p. 2.]

"Armed confrontations between Jews and Russians originated near the Jewish district of Moldavanka in the afternoon and early evening of 18 October. The clashes apparently started when a group of Jews carrying red flags to celebrate the October Manifesto attempted to convince a group of Russian workers to doff their caps to the flags. Harsh words were exchanged, a scuffle ensued and then shots rang out. Both groups scattered, but quickly reassembled in nearby streets and resumed fighting. The clashes soon turned into an anti-Jewish riot, as Russians indiscriminately attacked Jews and began to vandalize and loot Jewish homes, apartments, and stores in the neighborhood. The rioters also turned on policemen and troops summoned to quell the disorders, actions suggesting that pogromists were not yet fully focused on Jews in their attacks. The military on October 18 was equally vigilant in its efforts to restrain both Russian and Jewish rioters, vigorously suppressing these disturbances and restoring order by early evening. Four Russians were killed, dozens of Russians wounded – including policemen – and twelve Russians arrested as a result of the unrest. The number of Jews who were injured or arrested is unknown." [Ibid.; p. 3.]

——–
Also Robert Weinberg elaborates on the how xenophobia and in particular anti-semitism became part of the social revolution. I do not suggest that the 1905 circumstances directly translate to the complexities of the Ukrainian revolts in the year 2014, but one should see these historical descriptions as a model of the many elements that interact when society is ‘fermenting’.
——-

"Two militantly patriofic and pro-tsarist groups, the Holy League and Unity and Strength, had been stirring up anti-Semitic sentiments in Odessa since late 1903, drawing their inspiration from the wellknown right-wing politicians V. M. Purishkevich and P. A. Krushevan. The latter‘s newspaper, Znamia (Banner), was frequently distributed free throughout the city, especially in the harbor and workers’ districts, and was accused by Mayor Zelenyi of fomenting a pogromist atmosphere. Beginning in late January 1905, leaflets circulated blaming the non-Russian nationalities, such as the Georgians, Poles, Armenians, and especially the Jews, for anti-govemment opposition. The pamphlets called upon Russians to “beat the Jews, students and wicked people who seek to harm our Fatherland” and rid Russia of Jews who “are the cause of evil and grief.” The Russian Assembly, the largest right-wing grouping in Russia at the time, also contributed to the anti-Semitic atmosphere by opening a local chapter in early 1905. "
[Weinberg, Robert. 1993. The revolution of 1905 in Odessa: blood on the steps. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ; p. 138. www.worldcat.org/oclc/26129832 ]

"During the June unrest, right-wing agitators and pogrom-mongerers appeared in the street. They ac- cused Jews of instigating the current disorders and and encouraged gentiles to attack them. An SR account mentions bicyclists passing out leaflets blaming the Jews for the unrest of June 13, 14, and 15. Similar provocations also occurred during the riot and destruction of the harbor on June 15, resulting in the death of two anti-Semitic rabble rousers: one was shot by Bundists, the other thrown into the Black Sea by furious workers. In one instance a group of workers, at the urging of a Bundist speaker, beat to death a policeman from the Port Authority who had heckled the orator and tried to incite the crowd against her with anti-Semitic remarks." [Ibid.; p. 139.]

"Jews prompted activist Jews to mobilize. Unlike in past years, when they did not take precautions, Jews in Odessa braced themselves for attacks. Building on self-defense groups they had first formed (with the assistance of the Zubatovites) in the aftermath of the 1903 Kishinev pogrom and when fear of a pogrom spread through the city in 1904, Odessa’s Jews armed themselves and issued appeals, calling upon non-Jewish residents of Odessa to show restraint and not engage in violent acts against Jews. Just before Easter Sunday, which fell on April 17, the National Committee of Jewish Self-Defense distributed a series of leaflets threatening non-Jews with armed retaliation in the event of a pogrom. The committee urged all Jews to join self-defense brigades and prepare to counter any attack on Jewish lives and property. Many Jewish residents of Odessa followed the committee’s advice to arm themselves with guns, knives, clubs, and whips, and to prepare solutions of sulfuric acid. The Bund, Bolsheviks, and Menshevilts joined in these efforts by reorganizing self-defense brigades they had formed the year before and taking up collections for the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition. The Bund in particular feared that street demonstrations planned for Monday, April 18, to coincide with May Day celebrations in the rest of Europe, would lead to anti-Jewish violence. Despite these preparations, local officials as well as the correspondent of the Bund’s newspaper concluded that rumors of a pogrom were unfounded. In fact, the Bund’s correspondent wrote that “a pogromist mood was . . . unnoticeable”; Neidhardt’s office stated that it had not observed any “pogrom-mongering leaflets,” condemned the leaflets of the National Com- mittee of Jewish Self-Defense for “slander” and for giving rise to “alarm among the peaceful residents of our cultured city." April 17 and 18 came and went without serious incident or sign of trouble. The same could not be said for events in June. During the June unrest, right-wing agitators and pogrom-mongerers appeared in the street. They ac- cused Jews of instigating the current disorders and and encouraged gentiles to attack them. An SR account mentions bicyclists passing out leaflets blaming the Jews for the unrest of June 13, 14, and 15. Similar provocations also occurred during the riot and destruction of the harbor on June 15, resulting in the death of two anti-Semitic rabble rousers: one was shot by Bundists, the other thrown into the Black Sea by furious workers. In one instance a group of workers, at the urging of a Bundist speaker, beat to death a policeman from the Port Authority who had heckled the orator and tried to incite the crowd against her with anti-Semitic remarks. In the week or so following the massive disorders of mid-June, scattered attacks against Jews were reported as anti-Semitic agitators tried to spark a pogrom among gentiles. On June 20, an anonymous, virulently anti-Semitic, four-page broadside entitled Odesskie dni (Odessa Days) appeared. It blamed the Jews, in particular the National Committee of Jewish Self-Defense and Jewish secondary school students, for the recent disorders and the tragedy at the port. Accusing Jews of fomenting the unrest and enlisting the support of unwitting Russians, the author of the broadside stated that Jews initiated the shootings of June 14 and 15 and were responsible for setting fire to the port. The tract ended with a call to hold the Odessa Jewish community collectively responsible for the destruction and demanded compensation for gentiles who suffered property damage and personal loss. In addition, the broadside called for disarming all Jews in Odessa and suggested a general search of all Jewish apartments in the city. Failure to carry out these suggestions, the tract concluded, would make it “impossible for Christians to live in Odessa” and result in a take-over by Jews." Although Odesskie dni did not call for acts of mti-Jewish violence and did not lead to any attacks on Jews, its appearance graphically illustrates how in times of social unrest and political crisis, ethnic hostility could come to the fore and threaten further disruption of social calm. Jews found it diflicult to dispel the accusations expressed in Odeski: dni, which found their way into the reports of government officials who also held Odessa Jewry responsible for the June unrest." Gendarme chief Kuzubov wrote that the instigators of the unrest and arson were “exclusively Jews,” and Count Aleksei P. Ignat’ev, the fiercely reactionary chairman of a government conference set up in 1905 to address the issues of state security and religious minorities, seconded this conclusion in his report on the June disorders in Kherson and Ekaterinoslav provinces. Ignat’ev, who fell victim to an SR assassin in late 1906, accused Jews of setting fire to the port, although he, like most other government ofiicials, furnished no hard evidence or substantiation.“ These reports highlight the emotionally charged aunosphere of Russian-Jewish relations in Odessa and the extent to which government officials were hard-pressed to make nuanced assessments. In their search for simple explanations and their unwillingness to dig deeper into the root causes of the turmoil in Odessa, bureaucrats and police alike were prepared to affix blame to the Jews. The anti-Jewish campaign in June foreshadowed events in October, when a vicious pogrom would erupt during another period of social and political turmoil." [Ibid.; p. 139-140.]

(4) In a way all nations are ‘cultural constructs’ and based on a past that is both real and imagined. Religion and ethnicity tend to be elements in the construction of ‘nationalities’ and often lead to exclusion instead of inclusion. The recent Balkan War is a bad example and the debated need for a split up between Czechia and Slovakia yet another, be it less violent. The reconstructed Baltic states have in several cases lead to new forms of discrimination of those who do not fit in the ‘nationalist’ schemes. A similar process is taken place now in the Ukraine.
This study on that phenomenon may help to come to some understanding and as it’s title says, there is a view that ‘nationalism’ should be transgressed hence the term ‘transnational.

A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography Georgiy Kasianov, Philipp Ther This is a first attempt to present an approach to Ukrainian history which goes beyond the standard ‘national narrative’ schemes, predominant in the majority of post-Soviet countries after 1991, in the years of implementing ‘nation-building projects’. An unrivalled collection of essays by the finest scholars in the field from Ukraine, Russia, USA, Germany, Austria and Canada, superbly written to a high academic standard. The various chapters are methodologically innovative and thought-provoking.The biggest Eastern European country has ancient roots but also the birth pangs of a new autonomous state. Its historiography is characterized by animated debates, in which this book takes a definite stance. The history of Ukraine is not written here as a linear, teleological narrative of ethnic Ukrainians but as a multicultural, multidimensional history of a diversity of cultures, religious denominations, languages, ethical norms, and historical experience. It is not presented as causal explanation of ‘what has to have happened’ but rather as conjunctures and contingencies, disruptions, and episodes of ‘lack of history.’

"Another basic feature of the canon of nationalized history is its ethnocentricity, which readily turns into egocentricity. Since its principal subject is the Ukrainian people, and, according to the corresponding intellectual tradition, the “Ukrainian people” is a particular ethnos or group of culturally, linguistically and even genetically related ethnoses and subethnoses, it is clear that national history is concerned above all with the transformation of this people and ethnos into a nation. A characteristic feature in this regard is the identification of the concept of the “Ukrainian people” with that of the “Ukrainian nation.” This gives rise to another important feature of nationalized history: its claim to ethnic exclusivity. The history of Ukraine is the history of ethnic Ukrainians. A number of approaches are possible here. The coarsest of them consists in ignoring the presence of other ethnoses or nations in what was actually a common space and time; the denial of a whole system of mutual cultural, psychological, political, and economic influences; and the refusal of the right of other nations to exist “inside” Ukrainian nationalized history. A variant of this approach recognizes the presence of other peoples (ethnoses) in nationalized history as a background required to reinforce and structure the history of one’s own nation. Mention must also be made of claims to the particularly tragic and sacrificial character of Ukrainian history—an extreme and rather superficial variant of exclusivity. Finally, one of the most prominent elements of the canon is the linearity and absolutization of the historical continuity of the “ethnospeople- nation.” The outstanding example is the well-known “metamorphosis” of Ukrainian history as it makes its way through various schemes of periodization. Although this construction is well known, it is worth considering once again in order to make the argument complete: first we have the presence of autochthonous tribes since prehistoric times (Trypilian culture);9 this is followed by the age of the early Slavs; the beginnings of statehood; the development of statehood and political consolidation in the times of Kyivan Rus!; the torch is passed to the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia; there follows the Polish-Lithuanian era, with its separate ethnoconfessional status; the Cossack era and seventeenth- century statehood; the Hetmanate and limited autonomy; the decline of the Hetmanate, with compensation in the form of cultural and territorial patriotism, as well as the “national renaissance”; the apogee of the latter in the Revolution of 1917–21 (here the names vary, from the wholly ideological “liberation struggle” or “national revolution” to the more neutral “Ukrainian Revolution”). Unity is then somewhat infringed, but not radically. Some consider the Soviet period and Soviet Ukrainian statehood a break in continuity (successfully compensated by the existence of a national-liberation movement in a variety of manifestations, which, to be sure, also underwent a “metamorphosis” from one form to another). Others think of Soviet Ukrainian statehood as an element of continuity, as recently manifested with particular acuteness by the peculiar jubilee (eighty-fifth birth anniversary) of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky.10 Finally, 1991 becomes the crown of a “thousand-year history.” This is the point at which the “non-historic” nation finally turns into a “historical” one and history is activized in reverse—the existence of a state in the present begins to call for something similar in the past."
[Kasʹi︠a︡nov, H. V., and Philipp Ther. 2009. A laboratory of transnational history Ukraine and recent Ukrainian historiography. Budapest: Central European University Press. hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08644. ; p. 17. www.worldcat.org/oclc/317551846 ]

"To be sure, in speaking of the Ukrainian national historical myth one should not consider it fully formed or, most importantly, functional. However paradoxical it may seem, this myth remains quite amorphous despite certain distinct and stable features. The myths created in nineteenth- century grand narratives cannot simply be reinstalled in historiography and mass consciousness, if only because the geographic configuration of contemporary Ukraine does not allow it. Since the ethno – national myth is an element of exclusivist history intended to fulfill mainly ideological functions, it is difficult to address it to and impose it on a considerable part of the population, even within the Ukrainian ethnic community. For instance, the Cossack myth does not have powerful emotional resonance in the western regions of Ukraine, while the heroic myth of the nationalist movement and the armed struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the Second World War, which is particularly important in western Ukraine, is actively rejected in the east. Let us add to this the presence and continued functioning in intellectual space of the remains of Soviet intellectual mythology and the introduction of new, confrontational myths associated with the struggle against that Soviet mythology. These include the myth imported from the diaspora and then reconstructed in Ukraine of the deliberately anti-Ukrainian “ethnocidal” policy of the Soviet state and the powerful related thematic line of the famines and repressive policies of the 1920s–40s. This myth (whatever the real grounds for it that can be found in the past) also serves as a powerful explanatory tool in current political debates and collective memory construction: political, economic and cultural problems are often explained as an outcome of human losses suffered by the Ukrainian people during the Soviet period." [Ibid.; p. 19.]

July 12-25, 1946: corvette HMAS TOWNSVILLE at the centre of a mix-n’match group of WWII vessels at Fremantle, including cruiser HMS SWIFTSURE – RAN
Resume writing
Image by Kookaburra2011
6809: On a cold and windy day, this very eclectic and mis-matched group of vessels have washed up at H Shed, Victoria Quay, Fremantle. The whole atmosphere of this odd grouping of diverse and hard-worked looking ships is one of the dispersal of war vessels after the end of the Pacific War, with the ships of the British Pacific Fleet – like the Minotaur Class cruiser, HMS SWIFTSURE here – working their way home through Australian ports.

On the far left of the image we think is the gallant little survey tender HMAS STELLA [gallant because she was one of a trio of small ships conducting surveys in New Guinea almost under the noses of Japanese forces, and endured air attacks]. She is outboard of a lugger-type vessel, both creating a slight air of randomness in the photo by being faced towards the other vessels. In the centre is the minesweeper corvette HMAS TOWNSVILLE, built by Evans Deakin in Brisbane and completed in Nov. 1941, another New Guinea veteran. Astern of her is the Royal Navy Minotaur Class 6-inch gun cruiser, the 8,8000 tons [standard] 11,130 tons [full load], HMS SWIFTSURE with her flags streaming proudly in the breeze. She looks enormous in this one-tenth sized company.

Outboard of SWIFTSURE is a 768 tons [standard] -1000s ton [full load] Bar Class boom defence vessel [BDV], HMAS KARANGI, based in Fremantle, which first led us to the location of this uncaptioned image.

Many thanks to Dr Michael Gregg of the WA Maritime Museum for the dating, confirmation and added details to our first guesses for this now- re-written Entry. We got quite a lot of things right for this image in the RAN’s online Navy Heritage Collection, but now have the authority of precise details from Michael, and the added atmosphere of this story:

"SWIFTSURE’s visit was not without incident," Michael writes in ‘comments’. "A Royal Marine, Leslie Slater, suffered serious injuries when he fell 40 feet through the ceiling of the Fremantle Town Hall while decorating it for a performance by the ship’s band; the hungry crew apparently spent over £10,000 on food whilst in port; two seamen were arrested for stealing from one of the ship’s Chinese laundrymen; and she left carrying 150 tons of food, a gift from the people of WA to those "back home".

"The vessels on the left are I believe HMAS STELLA, and maybe the seized ketch TAIPAN, ex-BANDOENG MARU. Both were at the time in the process of being handed over to the CSIRO, where STELLA would resume her name WARRANEEN [our note, WARREEN?], and TAIPAN would be sold on to a bunch of dreamers who planned to sail the world in her as the yacht SHANGRI-LA."

An additional comment from Michael:" Interesting in light of your previous comments on the botched modernisation of HMAS HOBART [recent Entry], SWIFTSURE went through a very similar incomplete refit, before being scrapped, uncompleted."

Again, many thanks. We’ve added a lot to the public record here and – from no caption at all – made this a most satisfying and well-informed Entry.

Photo: RAN, it appears in the Navy Heritage Collection, image ID NO. 01844.

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 2

Some cool Resume images:

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 2
Resume
Image by COD Newsroom
College of DuPage hosted its second annual Career Fair, sponsored by the Chicago Tribune Feb. 8, on the College’s main campus in Glen Ellyn.

The event provided information and networking opportunities for job seekers who are unemployed or underemployed, looking to change careers, or recent graduates who are not yet employed in their chosen field.

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 17

Some cool Resume images:

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 17
Resume
Image by COD Newsroom
College of DuPage hosted its second annual Career Fair, sponsored by the Chicago Tribune Feb. 8, on the College’s main campus in Glen Ellyn.

The event provided information and networking opportunities for job seekers who are unemployed or underemployed, looking to change careers, or recent graduates who are not yet employed in their chosen field.

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 9
Resume
Image by COD Newsroom
College of DuPage hosted its second annual Career Fair, sponsored by the Chicago Tribune Feb. 8, on the College’s main campus in Glen Ellyn.

The event provided information and networking opportunities for job seekers who are unemployed or underemployed, looking to change careers, or recent graduates who are not yet employed in their chosen field.

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 5

Some cool Resume images:

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 5
Resume
Image by COD Newsroom
College of DuPage hosted its second annual Career Fair, sponsored by the Chicago Tribune Feb. 8, on the College’s main campus in Glen Ellyn.

The event provided information and networking opportunities for job seekers who are unemployed or underemployed, looking to change careers, or recent graduates who are not yet employed in their chosen field.

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 6
Resume
Image by COD Newsroom
College of DuPage hosted its second annual Career Fair, sponsored by the Chicago Tribune Feb. 8, on the College’s main campus in Glen Ellyn.

The event provided information and networking opportunities for job seekers who are unemployed or underemployed, looking to change careers, or recent graduates who are not yet employed in their chosen field.

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 1

A few nice Resume images I found:

Career Fair at College of DuPage 2014 1
Resume
Image by COD Newsroom
College of DuPage hosted its second annual Career Fair, sponsored by the Chicago Tribune Feb. 8, on the College’s main campus in Glen Ellyn.

The event provided information and networking opportunities for job seekers who are unemployed or underemployed, looking to change careers, or recent graduates who are not yet employed in their chosen field.

Updated CV 2010
Resume
Image by irrezolut
Fancy design version. Emulating CustomInk style guide.

LST-56
Resume
Image by L’hò

Chattanooga Update – June 16, 2014

Chattanooga is losing the Delta Queen. The 87-year-old riverboat has been sold to a group of investors for an undisclosed sum. This summer, the U.S. Senate is expected to lift rules to allow…